Raisina Science Diplomacy: From Patent Velocity to Industrial Capability and a New Global Technology Order

Science diplomacy is entering a new phase. It is no longer confined to scientific exchanges, academic cooperation or government-to-government research agreements. At the 2026 Raisina Dialogue Science & Diplomacy Initiative, the central questions were much broader: how should countries pursue strategic autonomy while science remains inherently international; how should emerging technologies be governed; who shapes standards and rules; and how can countries build domestic capability without withdrawing from global research networks? The programme explicitly connected science diplomacy with strategic autonomy, supply chains, export controls, intellectual property, data localisation, trusted partnerships and co-development of critical technologies.

Seen from this perspective, India's science diplomacy cannot be understood only through diplomatic agreements. It must also be examined through the country's emerging technological and industrial capacity. The five datasets developed for this analysis provide such a bridge. They move the discussion from diplomacy as a foreign-policy instrument to diplomacy supported by measurable capability: patents create knowledge, intellectual property creates ownership, industrial policy creates production, exports create international scale, and technology partnerships create the foundation for influence.

The first dataset establishes India's position in the global patent system. World patent applications reached approximately 3.55 million in 2023, with India recording 64,480 applications by origin and ranking sixth among the major origins in the supplied WIPO dataset. China led with about 1.64 million, followed by the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Germany. India's significance therefore does not lie in being the world's largest patent filer. The stronger observation is its acceleration. India's origin filings grew 15.7 percent in 2023, described in the supplied data as the fastest growth among the top 20 origins. Resident participation also reached 55.2 percent, crossing half of India's filings for the first time.

This matters for science diplomacy because a country that produces knowledge has a different diplomatic position from a country that merely imports knowledge. Patent activity does not automatically equal technological leadership, but increasing domestic participation indicates that a larger part of the innovation process is occurring within the country. The movement from a 24.8 percent resident share in 2013 to 55.2 percent in 2023 therefore represents more than an administrative statistic. It suggests a gradual domestication of innovative activity.

The second dataset takes the analysis deeper by examining India's wider intellectual-property ecosystem. India recorded 92,168 patent-office applications in 2023–24, of which 51,574 were by Indian applicants. Domestic filings subsequently reached 68,201, or 61.79 percent of office filings, according to the supplied 2024–25 data. Patent grants increased sharply, design filings also expanded, and India's trademark position reached fourth globally in the supplied data. ICAR's cumulative patent applications reached 1,706 through 2024.

The significance of this second dataset is that innovation is broader than patents by origin. A modern technology economy requires intellectual property, trademarks, designs, research institutions, agricultural innovation, startups and commercialisation mechanisms. ICAR is particularly important because it demonstrates that India's innovation base is not restricted to software or electronics. Agricultural science itself becomes part of the country's technological diplomacy when research, intellectual property, startups, technology transfer and international agricultural cooperation intersect.

The third dataset marks the transition from knowledge creation to industrialisation. India's Production-Linked Incentive programme for large-scale electronics manufacturing had 32 approved beneficiaries in the supplied data. Investment against a target of ₹7,000 crore reached ₹17,519 crore; production against a target of ₹8,12,550 crore reached ₹11,01,813 crore; and exports against a target of ₹4,87,530 crore reached ₹6,20,974 crore by February 2026. Direct employment reached 1,85,175 against a target of 2,00,000.

The importance of these numbers is not simply that targets were exceeded. They demonstrate a transformation in the relationship between intellectual capability and physical production. Patent systems create knowledge, but factories create productive capacity. Production creates supply chains, and supply chains create international interdependence. This is where science diplomacy begins to intersect with industrial diplomacy.

Global companies such as Foxconn, Wistron, Pegatron and Samsung, alongside Indian companies such as Lava, Micromax, Optiemus and Dixon/Padget, are part of this manufacturing ecosystem in the supplied dataset. Electronics exports reached approximately US$47 billion in 2025, while smartphones became India's top export product in the supplied data. Yet the same dataset contains an equally important qualification: domestic value addition in electronics remains around 18–20 percent.

That number changes the interpretation. India has demonstrated an ability to attract investment, expand production and integrate into global manufacturing chains, but the next technological challenge is to increase the Indian share of the value embedded in those products. Components, semiconductor fabrication, design, intellectual property, engineering, research and standards therefore become more important than simply increasing assembly volumes.

This is where the fourth dataset—industrialisation efficiency—adds another dimension. Investment reached 2.5 times the original target, production reached 1.36 times the target and exports reached 1.27 times the target, while employment reached approximately 92.6 percent of its target. The numbers show that industrial expansion has been particularly strong in capital deployment, production and exports. At the same time, employment has not expanded at exactly the same rate. The pattern is consistent with a manufacturing model in which scale, capital intensity, automation and global supply-chain integration matter greatly.

The implication for science diplomacy is significant. The diplomatic value of manufacturing does not arise merely because a factory exists. It arises when domestic manufacturing begins to support engineering capabilities, supplier ecosystems, technology transfer, research, standards and eventually indigenous intellectual property. The Raisina discussion on strategic autonomy therefore finds a concrete economic counterpart in India's attempt to move from being a large technology market to becoming a location where technology is researched, manufactured, integrated and exported.

The fifth dataset extends this argument beyond electronics. Semiconductor manufacturing has commenced in India, with the supplied data recording two plants in commercial production and a Semicon 2.0 allocation of ₹1,27,500 crore. The appropriate description is therefore that semiconductor manufacturing has commenced—not that India has already achieved global semiconductor leadership.

Aerospace provides an even more revealing example. Airbus–Tata has two final-assembly lines in the supplied dataset: the H125 helicopter facility and the C295 military transport facility. The H125 line is described as India's first private helicopter final-assembly line, with the first Made-in-India helicopter expected in early 2027. Safran's Indian footprint is described as extending over 70 years, with approximately 3,500 employees and 18 sites, while its Hyderabad LEAP MRO facility is described by Safran as the world's largest LEAP MRO facility.

The aerospace story therefore illustrates a capability ladder: final assembly, component manufacturing, engine systems, maintenance and repair, engineering, research and eventually space-related technology. The supplied data on the Safran–HAL engine relationship, aerostructures and research links reinforce this wider ecosystem rather than presenting aerospace as a single factory story.

The same pattern appears in other sectors. India's pharmaceutical industry is described in the supplied data as third globally by volume and 11th by value, with approximately 3,000 companies and 10,500 manufacturing units. The Green Hydrogen Mission targets 5 million tonnes of annual production by 2030, while hydrogen mobility pilots include 37 vehicles and nine stations under a ₹496-crore programme. These are not equivalent stages of maturity: pharmaceutical manufacturing represents established scale, whereas hydrogen remains partly a demonstration-and-deployment story. That distinction is essential.

Space and connectivity provide another layer. Starlink's entry into India through partnerships with Jio and Airtel, its Department of Telecommunications licence, subsequent connectivity activity and later direct-to-device application demonstrate India's importance as a regulated technology market. They should not, however, be confused with evidence that India has already developed the entire underlying satellite-manufacturing capability. The distinction between technology deployment and technology ownership is precisely the kind of distinction that strategic technology diplomacy must make.

This brings the five datasets back to Raisina. The 2026 Science & Diplomacy Initiative explicitly asked how science diplomacy can preserve international scientific collaboration while countries pursue strategic autonomy. It also examined governance of disruptive technologies, the role of large technology companies, data, standards, global value chains and the possibility that existing institutions may not adequately manage rapidly changing technologies.

India's data suggest that strategic autonomy need not mean technological isolation. Instead, it can mean building enough domestic capability to participate in global technology networks from a stronger position. This is also consistent with the broader technology-diplomacy approach described in earlier ORF analysis, which has characterised India's engagement with advanced technology powers and the Global South as an effort to strengthen domestic capability while participating in global technology governance.

The science-diplomacy evidence supplied for 2025–26 shows extensive science and technology frameworks involving the United States, France, Japan, Germany and Australia, alongside cooperation involving Russia and Brazil. The quarterly CSIR-NIScPR Science Diplomacy publication itself describes its purpose as connecting science, technology, innovation and international affairs. France connects with India through aerospace, Safran, space and other technology areas; Germany through technology and manufacturing cooperation; Japan through science and technology cooperation; Russia through nuclear and space relationships; and Brazil through BRICS and Global South engagement. These should be understood as documented cooperation frameworks, not as evidence that any country is automatically favouring India.

The emerging picture is therefore more interesting than the simple idea of “soft power.” Soft power traditionally describes the ability to attract or influence through ideas, culture and reputation. India's emerging science diplomacy increasingly has a material component. Patents provide knowledge. Industrial policy creates manufacturing scale. Aerospace and semiconductor programmes create technological capability. Pharma creates global supply-chain depth. Hydrogen and space create future technology platforms. Exports create international market presence. Standards and research partnerships can then translate capability into institutional influence.

The United States and other major technology powers have similarly treated technology as a diplomatic issue. Earlier US technology-diplomacy frameworks explicitly linked foundational technologies, supply chains, standards, governance and national security. The Raisina debate consequently belongs to a larger transformation in international relations: technology is no longer merely an economic sector operating alongside diplomacy; it is increasingly one of the arenas through which diplomatic power itself is organised.

The five datasets consequently produce a three-stage model for India. The first stage is innovation: patents, ICAR, research institutions and startups. The second is industrialisation: PLI, global OEMs, electronics, semiconductors, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, hydrogen and other advanced sectors. The third is internationalisation: exports, standards, technology partnerships and science diplomacy. This three-stage structure is supported by the underlying dataset and provides the bridge between India's domestic economic transformation and its international technology engagement.

The most important question for the next decade is therefore not simply how much India produces. It is how much Indian technological value is contained in what India produces. The 18–20 percent electronics domestic-value-addition figure makes this challenge visible. Moving upward requires deeper component manufacturing, semiconductor capability, design, R&D, patents, engineering and standards.

That is ultimately the significance of Raisina Science Diplomacy. Science creates knowledge; manufacturing creates capability; exports create scale; standards create influence; and diplomacy converts capability into partnerships. India's technological diplomacy will become more consequential as these elements reinforce one another.

The emerging trajectory can therefore be expressed simply:

Patent → IP → Research → PLI → Manufacturing → Components → Advanced Technology → Exports → Standards → Partnerships → Science Diplomacy.

India's transition is not yet complete, and the datasets do not justify claiming technological supremacy. They do, however, document a measurable movement from technology consumption toward technology creation, production, integration and international cooperation. In that transition lies the deeper meaning of science diplomacy: not diplomacy about science alone, but diplomacy backed by the capacity to create, manufacture, govern and share technology.