The New Global Economic Order: Trade, Supply Chains, Energy Security, AI and Emerging Markets
The global economy is undergoing a profound structural transformation. The traditional model of globalization—built around low-cost manufacturing, open trade, integrated supply chains and abundant energy—is being reshaped by geopolitical tensions, changing trade policies, energy shocks, technological disruption and the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence.
The latest assessments of the IMF, World Bank, ADB, WTO, FAO and IEA reveal that these developments cannot be examined independently. Slower merchandise-trade growth is closely connected with supply-chain fragmentation and geopolitical uncertainty. Energy prices influence inflation, manufacturing costs, food security and trade balances. At the same time, the rapid expansion of AI is creating a new investment cycle centred on semiconductors, data centres, digital infrastructure and electricity.
This transformation is also changing the relative importance of emerging markets. Asia remains one of the world's strongest growth regions, while countries such as India are seeking to combine domestic demand, manufacturing, digital services, infrastructure and technology to strengthen their position in global value chains.
The emerging economic order is therefore increasingly defined by resilience as well as efficiency. Countries and businesses are reassessing where they source critical inputs, how they secure energy, how they manage technology and how they protect themselves from external shocks.
This analysis brings together institutional forecasts and data on growth, inflation, trade, food, energy, supply chains and AI to examine the connections between them.
The central question is no longer simply who has the largest economy, but:
Who will be best positioned to control, connect and integrate the critical resources, technologies, capital and supply chains that will shape the global economy of the next decade?
1. Global Growth — What the Data Says
Global growth in 2026 presents a picture of moderate but uneven expansion. The World Bank projects global growth at about 2.6%, while the IMF's July forecast is 3.0%. ADB expects developing Asia-Pacific to grow around 4.9%, with India at approximately 6.9% in FY2026.
| Institution | Indicator | 2026 Forecast |
|---|
| World Bank | Global GDP growth | 2.6% |
| IMF | Global GDP growth | 3.0% |
| ADB | Developing Asia-Pacific | 4.9% |
| ADB | India | 6.9% |
The difference between the World Bank and IMF forecasts reflects different forecasting dates and assumptions rather than necessarily a disagreement about the direction of the economy. More importantly, the data shows a significant growth differential between advanced and emerging economies.
The first question is therefore not simply whether the world is growing, but where that growth is coming from. Developing Asia is expanding considerably faster than the global average, while several mature economies face slower growth because of ageing populations, high debt, mature markets and weaker productivity.
India's projected 6.9% growth is particularly significant. If sustained, faster growth can gradually increase India's share of global output and economic influence. But GDP growth alone is insufficient. It must translate into productivity, employment, investment and higher real incomes.
A second question is whether approximately 3% global growth is strong enough to generate broad improvements in living standards. The answer depends on population growth, productivity and the distribution of economic gains. Headline GDP growth does not automatically mean equivalent growth in per-capita income.
A third question concerns the risks to this outlook. Energy disruptions can raise transportation, manufacturing and fertilizer costs, creating inflationary pressure. Persistent inflation can keep interest rates higher for longer, reducing investment and consumption.
At the same time, a new positive force is emerging: AI-led investment. Spending on semiconductors, computing infrastructure, data centres and digital networks is creating additional demand and could eventually raise productivity.
The crucial distinction is that AI investment is not yet the same as AI productivity. Investment increases economic activity immediately; its long-term importance will depend on whether it raises output per worker and lowers production costs.
Thus, the data points towards two simultaneous economic cycles:
Energy + inflation + geopolitical risk → pressure on growth
AI + technology investment + productivity → support for growth
The central question is therefore:
Is the global economy entering a period of structurally slower growth, or is it beginning a new technology-led productivity cycle?
The answer will ultimately depend on what happens to productivity, investment, trade, energy costs and real incomes, not merely the headline GDP forecast.
2. Inflation — A Pause in Global Disinflation
Inflation has emerged as one of the most important risks to the global economic outlook. The IMF's July 2026 World Economic Outlook Update projects global headline inflation at 4.7% in 2026, up from 4.1% in 2025, before declining to 3.9% in 2027. This is significant because the global disinflation process that had been underway since early 2024 has effectively stalled.
| Indicator | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|
| Global headline inflation | 4.1% | 4.7% | 3.9% |
| Advanced economies | 2.5% | 3.0% | 2.4% |
| Emerging & developing economies | 5.2% | 5.8% | 4.8% |
The table reveals an important structural difference. Inflation is projected to remain considerably higher in emerging and developing economies, at 5.8%, compared with 3.0% in advanced economies. This makes developing economies more vulnerable to food, energy, exchange-rate and imported inflation shocks.
The immediate reason for the global reversal is largely the energy shock. The IMF states that higher energy and food prices are the principal drivers of the 2026 increase. Global inflation rose from 4.3% in March to 4.9% in May before easing to 4.7% in June, according to the IMF's latest data brief.
This creates a difficult policy environment. Central banks must control inflation without unnecessarily weakening economic activity. If they keep monetary policy restrictive for longer, borrowing becomes expensive, reducing investment, housing activity and consumption. If they ease policy too quickly while energy and food prices remain elevated, inflation expectations could become harder to control.
The distinction between headline and core inflation is therefore important. The IMF notes that core inflation has remained relatively stable in many countries, while headline inflation has been pushed higher by energy prices. This suggests that the current shock has not yet generated widespread second-round effects—but that risk remains.
The problem is particularly serious for economies that import large quantities of energy. Higher energy prices weaken their trade balances, raise production costs and reduce household purchasing power. By contrast, energy exporters may receive higher export revenues, creating a very different economic outcome from the same global price shock.
There is also a strong connection between inflation and trade. If geopolitical tensions fragment supply chains, the cost of moving goods and sourcing components can rise. The IMF specifically identifies deeper trade fragmentation as a risk that could simultaneously reduce output and increase prices.
However, the outlook is not entirely negative. The IMF expects inflation to fall to 3.9% in 2027, suggesting that the current acceleration may ultimately prove temporary if energy markets normalize and supply pressures ease. The institution also notes that increased renewable-energy use and lower energy intensity have made many economies more resilient to energy shocks.
The central issue, therefore, is whether 4.7% inflation in 2026 represents a temporary interruption in disinflation or the beginning of a more persistent structural inflation regime.
The evidence currently points to a temporary but significant interruption, with energy and food prices at the centre of the shock. But persistent geopolitical conflict, fragmented trade and repeated commodity shocks could make inflation substantially more difficult to control.
The policy challenge is no longer simply reducing inflation; it is achieving price stability without sacrificing the investment and growth required for the next economic cycle.
3. Asia & India — What the ADB Data Actually Says
Asia remains the principal growth engine of the developing world, but the latest Asian Development Bank (ADB) data shows that this growth is facing increasing pressure from energy costs, geopolitical disruption and weaker external demand. ADB's July 2026 Asian Development Outlook projects developing Asia and the Pacific to grow 4.9% in 2026, down from 5.5% in 2025, before recovering to 5.1% in 2027. Regional inflation is projected at 4.3% in 2026, compared with 3.0% in 2025.
| Indicator | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|
| Developing Asia-Pacific GDP growth | 5.5% | 4.9% | 5.1% |
| Developing Asia-Pacific inflation | 3.0% | 4.3% | 3.4% |
| India GDP growth | 7.6% | 6.6% | 7.3% |
| India inflation | 2.1% | 5.2% | 4.0% |
| China GDP growth | 5.0% | 4.6% | 4.5% |
The first important conclusion is that Asia's growth advantage remains intact, but its margin is narrowing. Developing Asia is still expected to grow considerably faster than the global economy, but the fall from 5.5% to 4.9% shows how strongly external shocks can affect the region. ADB attributes the moderation largely to higher energy costs, supply disruptions and tighter financial conditions.
India provides an especially interesting case. ADB's latest July forecast puts India's FY2026 growth at 6.6%, revised down from the 6.9% forecast published in April, while maintaining 7.3% for FY2027. The downward revision demonstrates that India's high growth is resilient but not immune to global shocks. Higher energy prices can reduce real household incomes, increase import costs and weaken domestic demand.
Yet the composition of India's growth is encouraging. ADB identifies domestic demand, consumption and investment as important supports. Manufacturing and services are also expected to remain strong. Manufacturing benefits from trade agreements and policy support for semiconductors, electronic components and rare earths, while services benefit from global capability centres and demand for high-value business services.
This answers an important question: Can manufacturing complement India's services economy? The ADB evidence suggests that it can. India's opportunity is not to replace services with manufacturing, but to create a combined model in which manufacturing, logistics, digital services, electronics and high-value business services reinforce one another.
The supply-chain question is equally important. ADB points to improved logistics, regulatory reforms and integration with global value chains as factors supporting investment. Trade agreements with major partners could further strengthen export competitiveness.
Infrastructure and energy are therefore central to the sustainability of India's growth. ADB notes that public investment remains important, with India's central-government capital expenditure budgeted to increase 11.5% in FY2026. It also identifies clean-energy investment and power-sector reforms as important for sustaining medium-term growth.
The AI question is particularly significant. Across Asia, technology investment is already influencing economic performance; ADB notes that high-technology and AI investment is providing support to China's economy. For India, the larger opportunity is to connect its digital ecosystem, skilled workforce, semiconductor ambitions, data infrastructure and expanding electricity capacity to global AI and technology value chains.
The data therefore leads to a broader conclusion:
India's high growth can increase its share of global economic power, but only if GDP growth is converted into sustained productivity, manufacturing capability, technology, infrastructure, energy security and integration with global value chains.
Asia's story is consequently not simply “high growth.” It is a contest to determine whether high growth can become durable economic power.
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook July 2026 and India economic forecasts.
4. International Trade — Globalization Is Changing, Not Disappearing
The WTO data points to a significant change in the structure of world trade. Its March 2026 outlook projects world merchandise-trade volume growth of only 1.9% in 2026, compared with 4.6% in 2025, before a modest recovery to 2.6% in 2027. By contrast, commercial services trade is projected to grow 4.8% in 2026 and 5.1% in 2027.
| WTO Indicator | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|
| Merchandise trade growth | 4.6% | 1.9% | 2.6% |
| Commercial services trade | — | 4.8% | 5.1% |
| AI-related trade | Strong expansion | Important growth driver | Continuing opportunity |
Merchandise vs Services — The Curve
The first question is why merchandise trade is slowing so sharply. The WTO identifies energy prices, geopolitical conflict, trade-policy uncertainty and weaker global demand as major pressures. Its March baseline estimated 1.9% merchandise growth for 2026; a high-energy-price scenario would reduce this to 1.4%, while sustained AI investment could add around 0.5 percentage points.
The second question is why services are performing better. Services increasingly depend on digital networks rather than physical transportation. Software, financial services, consulting, cloud computing and digitally delivered business services can cross borders without the same dependence on ships, ports and fuel as physical goods. The WTO therefore describes services as the most dynamic component of world trade, with 2026 growth projected at 4.8%.
This does not necessarily mean that globalization is ending. Rather, its composition is changing. Traditional globalization was heavily based on factories, containers, commodities and physical supply chains. The emerging model increasingly combines manufacturing with digital services, data, semiconductors and AI.
AI provides the clearest evidence of this transition. The WTO reported that stronger-than-expected 2025 trade was driven partly by surging demand for AI-enabling products. Its World Trade Report 2025 estimates that AI could increase global trade by 34–37% by 2040, if countries can overcome differences in adoption, infrastructure and capabilities. Digitally deliverable services could experience particularly strong expansion.
This creates both opportunities and risks for developing economies. Countries that can provide skilled labour, digital infrastructure, reliable electricity, competitive manufacturing and open trade policies can benefit from supply-chain diversification and AI-enabled services. Countries lacking these capabilities risk being left outside the highest-value segments of global trade.
The evidence therefore suggests that globalization is not disappearing; it is being reorganized.
Physical trade is becoming more vulnerable to energy shocks and geopolitical fragmentation, while services and technology-enabled trade are becoming increasingly important.
Central conclusion
The world is moving from a predominantly physical model of globalization toward a hybrid model in which goods, services, technology, data and AI are increasingly interconnected.
The decisive question for countries such as India is no longer simply “How much do we export?” but “What position do we occupy in the new global value chain?”
That means moving from low-value trade toward manufacturing + digital services + technology + AI-enabled exports. This is where the next phase of global economic competition is likely to be fought.
5. Food Security — Production Is High, but Access Remains the Challenge
FAO's latest data presents an important paradox in the global food economy. Global cereal production remains exceptionally high, yet food-price and food-security risks have not disappeared. FAO estimates 2026 cereal production at about 2,983 million tonnes, only 1.9% below the 2025 record, making it the second-highest production level on record. At the same time, the global cereal stock-to-use position remains relatively comfortable.
| Indicator | Latest FAO Data |
|---|
| Global cereal production, 2025 | ~3,043 Mt |
| Global cereal production, 2026 | ~2,983 Mt |
| Change | −1.9% |
| Global cereal utilization, 2026/27 | ~2,961 Mt |
| Global cereal trade | ~507 Mt |
| Food Price Index, June 2026 | 130.3 |
| Stock-to-use ratio | ~31.7% |
The first question is therefore: if production is so high, why can food inflation still occur? The answer is that food prices are determined not only by the quantity produced but also by energy, fertilizer, transport, weather, trade routes and market access. FAO reports that the Food Price Index was 130.3 in June 2026, still 2.2% above its level a year earlier, even though global cereal supplies remain strong.
Energy is particularly important because modern agriculture depends heavily on fuel, electricity and fertilizer. Higher energy prices increase farm operating costs and fertilizer costs; transportation then becomes more expensive. FAO specifically identifies spillovers from energy and fertilizer markets as an important risk to agricultural markets.
This also explains why food security is not simply a production problem. FAO reports that global food and agricultural trade has increased fivefold since 2000, but this greater integration also exposes countries to conflicts, extreme weather, financial shocks and disruptions to supply chains.
Trade routes are therefore crucial. A country may have sufficient global food production available but still face shortages or high prices if shipping routes are disrupted, imports become expensive, or domestic distribution systems are weak. FAO currently identifies geopolitical tensions and shipping disruptions as significant risks.
Weather adds another layer of uncertainty. FAO expects cereal production to remain historically high, but warns that El Niño and adverse weather conditions could reduce yields. Wheat production, for example, is expected to decline, while rice output is also projected below its previous record.
The data therefore suggests that future food security will depend less on simply producing ever larger quantities and more on maintaining resilient supply chains, affordable energy and fertilizer, open trade, adequate stocks and productive agricultural systems.
Agricultural technology can contribute by improving yields, water efficiency, fertilizer use and climate resilience, but technology alone cannot solve disruptions in logistics or international trade.
The central conclusion from the FAO data is therefore:
The world currently has substantial food-production capacity, but food security ultimately depends on whether food can be produced economically, transported reliably and accessed affordably.
In other words:
Production creates availability; trade creates access; energy and fertilizer determine cost; resilience determines security.
6. Energy — The Transition from Energy Security to Electricity Security
The IEA data shows that the global energy system is entering an “Age of Electricity”, but the transition is not yet a simple replacement of fossil fuels by renewables. Global electricity demand increased by about 3% in 2025, adding roughly 800 TWh, and the IEA expects average annual growth of 3.6% during 2026–2030. This would mean adding about 1,100 TWh of electricity demand every year.
| Energy Indicator | Data |
|---|
| Global electricity-demand growth, 2025 | 3.0% |
| Expected annual growth, 2026–30 | 3.6% |
| Additional demand annually to 2030 | ~1,100 TWh |
| Renewable share of electricity, 2025 | 34% |
| Coal share, 2025 | 34% |
| Wind + solar share, 2025 | 17% |
| Low-emission share by 2030* | ~50% |
*Renewables + nuclear.
The first question is whether the energy transition can keep pace with this rapidly rising demand. The answer from the IEA data is yes, but with significant infrastructure requirements. Renewable generation increased by about 8.5% in 2025, while solar PV alone added approximately 600 TWh. Global renewable generation almost matched coal generation during the year.
The second question is whether fossil fuels will disappear rapidly. The data suggests otherwise. Coal still supplied 34% of global electricity in 2025, equal to renewables, while natural gas supplied another 21%. However, the IEA expects coal's share to decline to around 27% by 2030, as renewables, nuclear and gas meet additional demand.
The third question concerns nuclear power. Nuclear generation reached a record level in 2025 and is expected to grow by an average 2.8% annually through 2030, providing firm low-emission electricity alongside variable renewable sources.
The fourth and increasingly important question is whether grids can accommodate industrial electrification, electric vehicles, cooling and AI-related data centres. The IEA expects electricity demand to accelerate to 3.6% annually through 2030, making grid expansion, storage, flexibility and transmission increasingly important.
Energy Transition Curve
The energy question has therefore changed. It is no longer simply “Can the world replace fossil fuels?” It is increasingly:
Can the world provide abundant, reliable and affordable electricity while simultaneously achieving energy security and decarbonisation?
The IEA data suggests that the next decade will be defined by rapid electrification, expanding renewables, rising nuclear generation and continued—though declining—dependence on fossil fuels.
7. Artificial Intelligence — From Technology to a New Economic Infrastructure
Artificial intelligence is increasingly becoming a macroeconomic variable, not merely a technology-sector development. The IMF's July 2026 outlook projects global growth at 3.0% in 2026, noting that AI-driven demand is supporting economies integrated into global technology value chains. The IMF also warns that the eventual growth effect depends on whether AI investment produces sustained productivity gains.
The WTO provides an even broader perspective. Its analysis estimates that, depending on adoption and productivity scenarios, AI could raise global GDP by 12–13% and global trade by 34–37% by 2040. Digitally deliverable services could see particularly strong expansion.
| AI Economic Indicator | Institutional Evidence |
|---|
| Potential global GDP increase by 2040 | 12–13% |
| Potential global trade increase by 2040 | 34–37% |
| Digitally deliverable services | ~42% increase in WTO scenario |
| AI productivity estimate | ~0.68 percentage-point annual TFP effect in cited research |
| Main infrastructure | Chips, computing, data centres, electricity |
The first question is how much growth AI can actually generate. The evidence suggests considerable potential, but the IMF emphasizes that investment alone does not guarantee productivity. The technology must diffuse beyond frontier firms and advanced economies into wider business activity.
The second question is who will capture the investment. Countries with semiconductor capability, skilled workers, digital infrastructure, capital and reliable electricity have a major advantage. The IMF specifically identifies infrastructure and skills as critical for emerging and developing economies.
The third question concerns trade. AI is simultaneously creating demand for hardware—chips, servers and computing equipment—and expanding digitally delivered services. Thus, AI could change not only productivity but also the geography of international trade.
The fourth question is inequality. Countries lacking computing infrastructure, skills and capital could fall behind, creating a wider AI divide. The WTO and IMF both stress that broad diffusion of AI is essential if its gains are to be widely shared.
AI's Economic Transmission
The central conclusion is therefore:
AI has the potential to become a general-purpose technology comparable in economic importance to earlier technological revolutions—but its economic impact will depend on productivity gains, infrastructure, skills and global diffusion, not simply the amount of money invested in AI.
For developing economies such as India, this creates a particularly important strategic opportunity: AI adoption could allow them to participate simultaneously in technology services, manufacturing, digital trade and global value chains.
8. Cross-Data Analysis — How the Variables Connect
The individual datasets become much more meaningful when examined together. The IMF projects 3.0% global growth in 2026, but also expects global inflation to rise to 4.7%, showing that growth is continuing while price pressures remain elevated. The IMF specifically identifies higher energy prices as a major reason for the interruption in global disinflation.
This creates the first relationship: growth versus inflation. If energy prices remain high, central banks may have less room to reduce interest rates, potentially weakening investment and consumption. Thus, maintaining growth while restoring price stability becomes the central macroeconomic challenge.
The second relationship is energy and trade. WTO projects merchandise-trade growth of only 1.9% in 2026, but estimates that a high-energy-price scenario could reduce it to 1.4%. At the same time, sustained AI investment could add about 0.5 percentage points to merchandise-trade growth.
This produces an important counterbalance:
Energy shock → weaker trade
AI investment → stronger trade
The third relationship is energy and AI. AI requires enormous quantities of electricity. IEA projects data-centre electricity consumption to roughly double from 485 TWh in 2025 to 950 TWh by 2030, while AI-focused data-centre consumption is expected to grow even faster. Therefore, AI growth itself increases the importance of reliable and affordable electricity.
The fourth relationship is India, trade and energy. ADB has reduced India's FY2026 growth forecast to 6.6%, citing elevated energy prices and their effect on domestic demand, while maintaining 7.3% for FY2027. India therefore illustrates how a fast-growing economy can still be vulnerable to external energy shocks.
The fifth relationship is AI and trade. WTO reports that trade in AI-enabling goods increased by more than 40% year-on-year in Q1 2026, demonstrating that AI is already affecting physical international trade, not merely future productivity.
The cross-data conclusion is therefore clear:
Energy is the immediate constraint, while AI is the emerging growth accelerator.
The economies best positioned for the next phase will be those that can secure affordable energy, attract AI investment, develop skilled human capital, maintain trade connectivity and convert technology investment into productivity.
The global economic question is consequently no longer simply “How fast will the world grow?”
It is:
Can AI-driven productivity and trade become strong enough to offset the inflationary, energy and geopolitical forces restraining global growth?
9. The Ultimate Question — What Will Determine Economic Power?
The data from the IMF, ADB, WTO, FAO and IEA suggests that economic power in the next decade will not be determined by GDP alone. It will depend on how effectively a country combines growth, capital, technology, energy, food security, trade and human capability.
The IMF's 3.0% global growth forecast for 2026 shows a moderate-growth environment, while inflation is expected at 4.7%. At the same time, AI investment is providing an important counterforce to energy and geopolitical pressures.
Asia demonstrates the importance of growth. ADB expects developing Asia-Pacific to grow 4.9% in 2026, with India at 6.6%, despite higher energy costs.
The WTO data shows that economic power is also shifting toward services, technology and AI-enabled trade, while traditional merchandise trade faces greater geopolitical and energy risks. Meanwhile, the IEA shows that electricity demand is growing rapidly, making reliable and affordable energy an increasingly important foundation for industry and AI.
This produces a connected economic chain:
GDP → Growth → Investment → Technology → AI → Electricity → Energy Security → Food & Industry → Trade → Capital → Economic Power
Food security remains part of the same equation because agriculture depends on energy, fertilizer, transport and trade. A country that controls or reliably accesses these resources is more resilient to external shocks.
Therefore, the future winners will not necessarily be today's largest economies. They will be countries capable of integrating capital, technology, energy, infrastructure, skilled human resources, food systems and global trade most efficiently.
The ultimate competitive advantage will be integration.
The next decade may therefore be less about who has the largest economy today and more about who can convert technology, energy and human capital into sustained productivity and global economic influence.
For India, this creates a strategic opportunity: combine high growth + manufacturing + digital services + AI + energy + infrastructure + global trade into one integrated growth model.
Conclusion — The Global Economy at a Turning Point
The combined evidence from the IMF, World Bank, ADB, WTO, FAO and IEA points to a global economy undergoing a structural transition rather than simply moving through another conventional economic cycle.
Global growth remains positive, but moderate, while inflation remains vulnerable to energy and food shocks. Merchandise trade is losing momentum, whereas services and technology-enabled trade are expanding faster. At the same time, Asia—particularly India—continues to provide an important source of global growth.
The most significant structural change is the emergence of AI and electrification as new drivers of economic activity. AI is increasing demand for semiconductors, data centres, digital services and skilled labour, while the IEA's electricity outlook demonstrates that this technological transformation requires enormous quantities of reliable power. Consequently, energy security is becoming a prerequisite for technological competitiveness.
The food data adds another dimension. Global production remains high, but affordability, logistics, fertilizer, energy and trade determine whether food actually reaches consumers at reasonable prices. Thus, resilience—not merely production capacity—is becoming central to economic security.
The evidence ultimately connects into one integrated system:
Growth → Investment → Technology → AI → Electricity → Energy → Food & Industry → Trade → Productivity → Economic Power
Countries that can integrate these elements will be better positioned to withstand inflation, geopolitical fragmentation and supply shocks while capturing the benefits of technological change.
For India, the opportunity is particularly significant. Sustaining high growth while strengthening manufacturing, infrastructure, energy security, digital services, AI capability, human capital and global trade integration could allow India to convert its growth advantage into long-term economic influence.
The defining economic competition of the next decade will not simply be between large and small economies. It will be between economies that can integrate technology, energy, capital, human talent and resilient supply chains—and those that cannot.
The future global economy will therefore be shaped not by one variable, but by the ability to connect all of them.
Labels: AI Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Markets, Energy Security, Global Economy, Global Growth., India Economy, International Trade, New Global Economic Order, Supply Chains
