ASI and Ramjanmbhoomi

.

Having read yesterday’s arguments of Ms. Meenakshi Arora, I am compelled to say that the submissions appeared unnecessarily verbose and, in several places, disconnected from the basic historical and archaeological facts. The Supreme Court is surely not the appropriate forum for rhetorical excess; the Court deserves concise arguments supported by evidence and reason.

Let us therefore come to the facts.

1. Carbon dating and the question of Muslim origin

It has been argued that certain artifacts have been carbon-dated to around the 7th century. Muslims invaded and established political power in India much later than that period. If the dating is accepted, on what historical or archaeological basis can those artifacts be attributed to Islam or a mosque? Chronology itself raises a fundamental question that cannot simply be brushed aside.

2. If the artifacts may be Buddhist or Jain, how does that support a mosque?

It has apparently been accepted that some of the artifacts could be associated with Buddhism or Jainism rather than Hinduism. But this itself establishes an important point: such artifacts would not be artifacts of a Muslim religious structure.

Moreover, the attempt to draw a rigid civilizational boundary between these traditions requires considerably more nuance. In the Hindu religious tradition, Lord Buddha is regarded as an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. Buddha was born at Lumbini, and the traditions surrounding his birth are rooted in the religious and cultural milieu of ancient India. Similarly, the concept of Chaturmas is found across Indian religious traditions, including Hindu and Jain traditions.

The existence of related religious concepts across Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions does not prove that every structure belongs to one particular faith. But neither can such common cultural features be casually used to deny the shared historical and civilizational context of ancient India.

3. Architecture, pillars and archaeological comparison

The shape and dimensions of the pillars and other structural elements deserve serious consideration. Similar circular structures and architectural elements have reportedly been identified by the ASI in the archaeological remains associated with ancient Dwarka, including underwater investigations.

Ancient builders ordinarily used stone and other materials available in their surrounding geographical region or through contemporary trade networks. Therefore, similarities in stone, dimensions, structural form and architectural technique cannot simply be dismissed without proper comparative analysis.

If archaeological structures at two historically significant sites display substantial similarities in dimensions, shapes, materials and architectural characteristics, the appropriate response is not rhetoric but scientific comparison. The evidence should be examined in the context of the architectural traditions of ancient India, particularly periods predating the establishment of Muslim rule.

4. Lotus symbolism, astronomical references and chronology

There is also the question of iconography.

Indian religious literature contains extensive symbolism associated with the lotus. Sita's traditional birth narrative is associated with the earth and the plough, while lotus symbolism is deeply embedded in Indian religious traditions. Lakshmi is traditionally associated with the lotus, and the lotus appears prominently in Vaishnava iconography and Hindu religious literature.

If an archaeological artifact contains a lotus motif together with an astronomical representation such as a solar eclipse, that evidence deserves careful interpretation. One must ask: what religious, cultural and astronomical tradition does such iconography most naturally correspond to?

It is particularly relevant if the artifact in question has been dated to approximately the 10th century. Such evidence should be interpreted objectively, rather than forcing it into a predetermined conclusion.

5. The argument concerning a previous temple

Finally, there appears to be an argument that even if a temple had existed earlier and was subsequently destroyed, the later construction of a mosque would somehow settle the question of ownership or historical legitimacy.

Consider the analogy.

Suppose I build a house on my land. The house is destroyed. My descendants do not have the resources to rebuild it. Years later, another person occupies the site and constructs a house there. Does the fact that the later structure exists automatically make that person the legitimate owner of the underlying land?

Obviously not.

The existence of a later structure and the question of the historical ownership or character of the underlying site are two different questions. Archaeology, historical records, inscriptions, architectural evidence and material remains must therefore be examined to determine what existed at the site before the later construction.

The Court does not need rhetoric, emotional appeals or unnecessarily prolonged arguments. It needs evidence, chronology, archaeology and law.

My sincere request is therefore simple: let us keep the arguments focused on the facts and the evidence. If the archaeological evidence supports a particular conclusion, establish it scientifically. If it does not, explain why.

Ultimately, common sense should complement evidence, not replace it—and neither should rhetoric replace either.

Ram mandir

The question of Ram Janmabhoomi cannot be discussed intelligently without first understanding the place of faith and belief in a religious claim.

Faith necessarily proceeds from belief. An atheist, by definition, does not accept the religious proposition on which such faith rests. The Court therefore cannot understand the nature of a religious claim by pretending that the underlying belief does not exist.

The Supreme Court itself recognized in the Ayodhya judgment that the faith and belief of Hindu devotees concerning Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman are matters of personal conscience and that the Court is not required to test the rationality or strength of that belief beyond determining whether it is genuinely held.

There is another important legal question.

In the case concerning Guru Granth Sahib, the Supreme Court recognized its capacity to be treated as a juristic person, arising from the religious significance accorded to it and its installation in a gurdwara. The same judgment also reaffirmed the established legal principle that a consecrated and publicly installed Hindu deity can possess juristic personality.

Then what is the objection to recognizing Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman as a juristic person?

In fact, in the Ayodhya proceedings, the legal personality of Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman was not contested. The Supreme Court itself dealt with the deity as the first plaintiff in Suit 5.

The distinction is important: the Court did not recognize the abstract geographical entity “Asthan Shri Ram Janam Bhumi” as a juristic person. But that is entirely different from the legal personality of the deity Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman.

The historical and textual evidence must also be considered carefully.

The Valmiki Ramayana describes Ayodhya as a magnificent and highly developed city and gives an extensive account of its religious and civic life. More importantly, Ayodhya Kanda contains a description of Rama staying with Sita in a splendid temple of Lord Vishnu.

Therefore, it is historically unsound to suggest that the Ramayana presents Ayodhya merely as an ordinary secular settlement devoid of established religious institutions.

At the same time, historical claims must be stated accurately.

It would be incorrect to assert without qualification that Babur's own Baburnama contains a straightforward statement that he personally destroyed the Ram temple and constructed the mosque. The surviving historical record is more complicated; Beveridge's notes concerning the inscription and the missing portions of the Baburnama contain an interpretation concerning the replacement of a Hindu shrine, but the underlying diary material is incomplete.

That does not end the historical inquiry. It simply means that the claim must be evaluated through all available evidence—archaeology, inscriptions, architectural remains, historical accounts, documentary records and evidence of worship—rather than through one disputed quotation.

And that is precisely why consistency is important.

If the law can recognize the religious significance of Guru Granth Sahib on the basis of the faith and practice of its followers, and if it can recognize a consecrated Hindu deity as a juristic person, then Hindu belief concerning Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman cannot be dismissed merely because the religious concept is unfamiliar or different.

Different religions may have different conceptions of the Divine. The law need not declare one theology correct and another incorrect. It must, however, apply the same legal standard to both.

That is the real issue.